



# The Nationalist

VOICE OF THE  
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT

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"Truth is the most powerful propaganda." — J.F.C. Fuller

## Developing NDF Leaders



Marshal Murat leading the charge against the Russian center at Eylau. Bureaucracies may thrive with timid automatons, but armies need officers who can act on their own initiative to seize fleeting opportunities.

We received such good response to our article on leadership published in the Dec88 **Nationalist**, including having it republished in the British nationalist magazine **Spearhead**, that we have decided to reproduce here another chapter from the same unpublished manuscript, **Cracks in the Shield: Toward a New Model Military**. This chapter is entitled "The Leader", and it seeks to describe the good leader, his attitudes, ethics and approach:

Clausewitz describes the great leader as a man who can generate enthusiasm and confidence while keeping his own emotions, and doubts, firmly under the control of his reason. I would agree with this evaluation, recognizing that Clausewitz is describing the military genius, a coldly calculating yet charismatic man. These men are rare, though not as scarce as people think. Most are crushed by military organizations. This is unfortunate because military geniuses are the most valuable resource of an army. But little minds fear and resent genius, and it is little men who run bureaucracies. The bureaucratization of world society has fulfilled the Biblical prophecy that the meek would inherit the earth. Bureaucrats are timid and afraid; and a world based on fear is a very brutal environment to live in, particularly for a sensitive and creative man. Intern-

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al savagry is maximized in the traditional military order; only the stupid and the conforming survive.

But conformity will not do in fast, fluid warfare in which leaders at every level must think and act on their own. Therefore, the first step in military reform is to create organizations and attitudes which will allow genius to rise to its proper station. The second step is to fashion military education in such a way as to create artificial genius, that is to bring ordinary officers as far along the road as possible toward becoming military artists.

#### THE TWO WAYS

Basically two approaches can be taken in the creation of the leader. The traditional approach is to crush the individual sense of identity and to reshape the military student into the mold of a good leader. This approach is called "character building." It assumes: 1) that there are particular personality traits which a great leader must possess, 2) that a man's sense of identity can be crushed without harmful side effect, and 3) that a man can be reshaped into an alien mold.

Character building seeks to refashion a man's emotional outlook, not his intellectual outlook. The object is to teach an officer to feel properly, not think properly. This is why there is so much emphasis on command intuition in the military. If something feels right,

it is right; if it feels wrong, it is wrong. This is, of course, a very limiting approach; an officer's actions are restrained and bounded by his limited past experiences when he relies upon intuition over creative analysis. Further, his imagination is greatly cramped by his feel for a situation and by his intuitive bounds.

#### FALSE ASSUMPTIONS

Aside from emphasizing emotionality over rationality, character building is based on assumptions that are largely false. There may be certain personality traits which are common and necessary to great leaders, but history gives little indication that this is so. The only personality trait that seems to be common to all the great captains of the past is great determination motivated by immense ambition. All stretched for goals that would be considered ridiculously out of reach by ordinary men. Most rebelled against authority and artificial constraints. But otherwise the personalities of the great captains were very different. Some were gentle and kind, others were strict and brutal. Some were forgiving, others were vindictive. Some were personally honest and trustworthy, others were not. Some were religious, others were not. Great men usually fit no conventional model of goodness, they go beyond good and evil to greatness, to a realm unimagined by their

contemporaries. A realm which can only be objectively evaluated generations later after the shock of its novelty has worn off.

The second assumption of character building has even less truth in it than the first. A man's sense of individual identity can never be fully wiped out. The process of crushing it shakes a man's self-confidence and self-esteem. It makes him timid and uncertain. He becomes unwilling to act on his own initiative or to trust in his own judgement. These are exactly opposite the qualities necessary in mobile warfare combat officers. Bureaucracies may thrive with automats but modern armies do not.

The third assumption of character building is also false. It would take a very great amount of time, if indeed it is possible at all, to completely reshape a man's character and personality into a new mold. The best that can be hoped for is a compromise. The nature of the end product can never be known, so the resulting compromise may be more harmful to military purposes than the man's original character. Remodeling personalities and characters is a risky and dangerous business especially for amateurs, and at this point in history even psychiatrists and psychologists are amateurs. Military officers are no more than alchemists in the field of psychology.

#### NECESSARY VALUES

Certainly, it is important that officers be inculcated with particular values and attitudes, but



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Gary Gallo, Editor



this evolution of thought can take place without a complete reformation of a man's emotional outlook. An approach superior to the emotional catharsis of character building is to tie changes in attitude to the understanding through reason. Only those attitudes that are functional to military purposes should be impressed upon officers in institutions of military education or in the military establishment itself. If attitudes are functional then it should not be difficult to show the military student how they serve military goals. If he understands the value of the attitude, he is more likely to embrace it than if it is forced down his throat and justified solely on the grounds of coming from superior authority. Further, if he understands the logic behind adoption of certain values and attitudes he will be better able to adjust his thinking to the changing circumstances of the future. Some values cease to be functional with time and an officer should be able to recognize this when it happens. Attitudes founded in reason will also be better able to survive shock; in the end they are stronger and more lasting than those resulting from brainwashing in an emotional pressure cooker.

An officer should be allowed to develop his own type of leadership. He will not be as comfortable,

confident or effective if he is forced into a foreign mode of behavior. An officer should be taught leadership principles and techniques, but he should be allowed to apply these in a manner that accords with his own personality. Each man must stress his particular strengths. There is no one style of leadership that befits all men.

Thus soft institutional and social pressure combined with reason is by far a better approach to changing attitudes than the destructive browbeating of character building. Soldiers can be rational if the military would only allow it. The military makes insanely violent attacks upon the minds and bodies of its new members and then expresses amazement at the irrational resistance to authority that most soldiers display. Many soldiers who are not openly defiant strike against the system in subtle ways such as blindly obeying stupid orders. This type of passive resistance is considerably more dangerous to a military organization than open defiance.

**WASTED POTENTIAL**


Clearly, there is much senseless destruction in the traditional approach to leader training beginning with the damage done to the individual sense of identity. The great majority of the youths who enter the service academies are bright,




In the Rommel Papers, Erwin Rommel explains under what circumstances a general must disobey his orders.

proud, determined, self-confident, self-reliant, and loyal to their nation. It is a shameful waste to destroy this fine foundation. The qualities mentioned above are those very elements of character which we should like to see in our officers, yet they are the first to go when a man suffers a "character-building" attack. His confidence and self-reliance disappear, he fears to think and act on his own, and his motivation suffers greatly. It would make much more sense to develop the valuable qualities that most cadets enter with and to add to them according to military purposes. Wholesale destruction of individual identity accomplishes exactly the reverse of what it is supposed to achieve. It is a sad waste of the great raw material that enters the service academies.

Individual identity cannot really be crushed; it merely assumes different forms. As I have already explained, service academy character building programs make the cadet more selfish and self-interested, not less so. This is because the cadets react against the system and because the system is essentially illegitimate. Thus one of the primary goals of character building - to get the cadet to identify with the army - is defeated. The cadet would identify with the military over himself if he thought the organization were good, and if he



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thought he had a meaningful place in it as an individual. But the academies denigrate individual importance and thereby defeat their own purposes. An individual is unwilling to sacrifice himself for a greater organization or cause if his effort is not appreciated or if his effort goes in vain. It is natural for a man to want to identify with a thing greater than himself whether it be a god, an organization or a cause. In this identification the individual becomes greater and more important psychologically. In their ruthless denial of the individual, traditional military establishments have managed to stunt this natural and militarily useful mechanism and have made soldiers thoroughly self-interested.

#### NEW ATTITUDES

What are the values and attitudes that should be inculcated into our officers? There are values that are not particularly important to leadership or command but which



Lt. Col. George Patton. He was forced out of the new armored corps and back to the cavalry in order to quash his advocating new ideas.

are essential to an officer understanding his role and to being a useful tool of society. The primary value for an officer is ultimate loyalty, that is an officer should be more loyal to the nation than the army, more loyal to the army than his division, more loyal to his division than to his immediate superior. If loyalty priorities are not correct the military will not be a useful political instrument, but merely a tool for the advancement of the personal interests of its officers. Thus the ultimate purpose of the military is thereby undermined, if not defeated.

The value of honesty in an officer corps should be obvious, and in its simplest sense it is; but when honesty is related to moral courage military men are faced with a real ethical dilemma. A morally courageous man will criticize the system and his superiors on principle, if he feels the system is not properly carrying out its duties for the greater good. But when does criticism become disloyalty? Criticism cannot be disloyal if it is aimed at serving the ultimate interests of the nation. Criticism can only be disloyal if it promotes the interests of a lower sphere over a higher one, e.g. if it seeks to serve the interests of the military at the expense of the nation.

Acting on moral courage is rarely disloyal as those who do stand on principle usually have greater interests than their own at heart. But standing on principle can often be dysfunctional. An officer must decide whether an issue is important enough to fight for and how far to carry on the fight. The officer must decide whether the disruption caused by his dissidence will ultimately hinder or serve the purposes he seeks to fulfill, that is whether his standing on this issue will make the military and the nation stronger or weaker in the end. So he must also calculate the probability of success to determine how, when, and where to commit himself.

#### TOLERATION OF CRITICISM

The dissident officer's superiors also face difficult decisions. They must determine how far they can afford to tolerate the dissent and what its ultimate effects will.

Their decision will rest mainly on how much merit they see in the dissident's arguments and how valuable the dissident is. This is as it should be, however, officers should also look at the value of criticism in its broadest context. Open discussion and critical analysis is the only means by which a military organization can progress over the long run. If officers crush their dissident subordinates in the name of short term efficiency and smooth operation, they are sacrificing the long term well being of the army. It is impossible to adapt to changing circumstances without criticism. Thus rebels, and their deviant views, should be treated with as much toleration as possible as they are the future of the army.

Toleration of deviance supposedly undermines discipline and respect for superiors. In one sense it does lessen respect for superiors because if criticism is allowed to exist the troops will know that their leaders are not infallible. Thus the military mystique loses some of its magic for the more gullible soldiers. The performance of troops in combat depends largely on their faith in their officers. But the troops are not stupid; they know their leaders are fallible. Troops in combat, particularly, know when a mistake has been made. In fact, they are usually the first to know. The confidence of the troops in their officers is not built on propaganda but on the actual competence of their commanders. An army that tolerates internal criticism will produce commanders of superior understanding and ability and this will create a willingness in the troops to obey. Further, the troops will recognize that good officers do not fear criticism. Only those officers who are afraid that their ignorance or stupidity will be revealed balk at allowing open discussion.

#### RESOLUTION

Another critical quality for an officer is resolution, i.e. the determination to see a difficult matter through. Often the most harrowing time in battle for a commander is when he is fully committed. Should he continue to fight



or should he break off the battle to avoid greater loss. In other words, when does determination become stubbornness? Clausewitz says that resolution cannot become obstinacy as they are two completely different things. Resolution is based on rational analysis of the available information. If a commander receives information that indicates that his plan is no longer valid yet he continues as before, then he is obstinate. The resolute commander sticks it out only as long as there is a reasonable chance for success in light of the available information. It comes down to the rational man versus the emotional man.

But even the intelligent commander is plagued by the fog of war, the lack of timely and accurate information. It would be a mistake to think of resolution as purely a rational quality. The emotional stress on a commander in battle is severe. He can only rise above it to rationality if he is able to detach himself from his immediate circumstances. In order to do that he must have a very powerful will. That is, he must exclude unimportant things from his thought in order that they do not distract him from the essentials of the matter he is dealing with. Further he must have the will to overcome his pre-

sent difficulties. He must desire victory above all things, otherwise he will surrender to the confusion and seeming hopelessness of the moment. The will to overcome difficulty is founded as much on motivation and commitment as on pure rationality. Without commitment there is no reason to overcome.

#### DISCIPLINE

Rationality is necessary to discipline as well as to resolution. Good discipline is a willingness to obey. But there are two types of obedience which are very different from each other. Blind obedience is where a subordinate obeys the orders he receives specifically and without question. Intelligent obedience is where a subordinate tries to determine his commander's intent from the order so as to best serve the commander's ultimate purpose.

Blind obedience is the traditional military virtue and is still worshipped today in most armies, including our own. At one time blind obedience may have been the superior form of discipline; that is, when armies were so small and slow that the commander of the army could see all of his units, there was little need for subordinate leaders to act on their own initia-

tive. The commander of the army knew the particular situations of his units almost as well as the subordinate commanders did. The subordinate commanders did not need to think; they merely had to react to their orders as martinetts. Naturally this system destroyed the intellectual ability of its officers, but in the days of kings, lateral entry of a brilliant military leader at the top was possible. A king could take command of an army without working his way up

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
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through a deadening system, or he could appoint a great mercenary leader to command his army.

But those days are long gone. Armies are now large and fast, and they operate over vast areas. Situations change so quickly that it is futile to transmit specific orders as they are overtaken by rapidly changing circumstances before they can be executed. Modern mobile warfare demands a new style of discipline. It is the duty of the modern subordinate commander to understand the circumstances and the goal of the operations he is involved in so that his work within his sphere will help achieve the ultimate aim.

#### ULTIMATE PURPOSES

If obedience is tied to ultimate purposes rather than immediate objectives there are circumstances in which a subordinate commander must disobey orders in order to fulfill his duty. Success in mobile warfare depends largely on opportunism. Mobile commanders must seize upon flaws in the enemy's defense before they are corrected. The moment for action often passes while a commander tries to get approval from higher headquarters, which often does not really understand the situation anyway. Thus a commander is justified in acting without orders or in contradiction to orders when seizing an opportunity offered by the enemy.

A similar situation exists in a defensive situation where a commander has better immediate information than his superior. For instance, suppose a unit has been ordered to defend a particular position. Unexpectedly the unit is threatened with encirclement from an enemy force which has broken through an adjacent friendly unit. At that point the unit commander has no time to contact higher headquarters, rather he must decide whether he should accept encirclement and likely extinction in order to slow the enemy advance or should withdraw to save his unit for later operations. The unit commander must decide which course is better on the basis of the ultimate interests of the army. If in his judgement withdrawal is more functional (as it often is under such circumstances) then he is justified in disobeying orders and acting on his superior knowledge of the situation.

A commander is also justified in disobeying unrealistic orders. In World War I it was common for a division commander to receive orders to attack a position which was obviously invincible, as practically all positions were on the Western Front. Few commanders had the moral courage to protest or to refuse to obey such insane orders. Rather they would execute the attack leaving thousands of dead on the battlefield for the gain of 100 yards or less. Then the division would be withdrawn until it was refilled with cannon fodder, and the division commander would receive another medal for bravery and skill.

If the division commanders had refused to obey their orders these senseless displays of slaughter would have ended early in the war as they should have. It took years of horrific bloodletting before the younger commanders of the French Army saw their duty and mutinied in 1917.

#### COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

If a commander is ordered to take an objective which he knows he cannot hold, then he has a duty to so notify his superiors and to act on his best judgement. Nothing undermines the morale and effectiveness of an army like huge losses taken in vain. A commander must balance the conflicting requirements of conserving his strength for ongoing and later operations as versus carrying out immediate orders which demand a great sacrifice in blood and which will leave the unit wrecked.

In World War II the Germans used Waffen-SS divisions to attack enemy strong points as Wehrmacht units would refuse to do it. This refusal would come in a number of forms. Sometimes the unit commander would claim that he simply did not have the strength to take the objective. If that failed to convince his superiors then he would attack, but he would not press it. His superiors would eventually get the message and would end the assault. Sometimes the troops would refuse to advance further under heavy fire and would simply stop and hold their positions. At that point the unit commander would tell higher headquarters that his troops were pinned-down and could go no further. Such realism led many of the

more conservative German generals to complain of a lack of discipline. General Blumentritt for example, claimed that German troops in World War I were better disciplined than those of World War II. The essential difference was that World War I troops would obey blindly and rush headlong into machinegun fire, whereas World War II troops would try to maneuver around fire, and if they could not, they would refuse to accept their own slaughter. The intelligent obedience or "ill-discipline" of Wehrmacht soldiers saved Germany from early exhaustion in the Second World War. Further, the morale of the Wehrmacht soldiers never cracked because they knew that their officers would try to save blood and would not sacrifice them in vain. But the morale of the German Army in World War I did break.

If a high commander receives orders which he believes will lose an important battle, then he has a duty to the nation to disobey those orders. High commanders must act responsibly, they cannot absolve themselves of the guilt for losing a battle by claiming that they were only obeying orders. Commanders have a moral responsibility to act on their own judgement as they should know the situation of their forces better than higher headquarters. Once a commander has disobeyed an order he should be judged primarily upon the results of his actions. If things turn out well the commander should be rewarded, if things turn out poorly the commander should be punished. However, results alone do not tell the whole story, and so the entire situation should be investigated to determine if the commander acted properly. A



General Erich von Manstein ordered the German army in Stalingrad to disobey Supreme Headquarters and break out toward his relief army. It refused, and 90,000 surrendered.



man should never be punished simply because he disobeyed an order, rather the extenuating circumstances and the results of his actions must be investigated. This is the only possible way to encourage soldiers to act on their own judgment and to encourage initiative.

#### INTELLIGENT OBEDIENCE

Intelligent obedience demands that a soldier be able to think outside of his sphere and yet act within it. In order for a commander to act in accordance with the will of his superiors he must be able to determine their ultimate design. Further, he must be able to determine in what direction to adjust his actions when things go completely awry. To do this he will have to make the very calculations that his superiors are making. He must understand the implications of his moves for higher spheres and be careful not to unhinge higher operations. A commander must act within his own sphere as much as possible so as not to usurp the prerogatives of his superiors. The leader who possesses a higher understanding of the operations he is involved in is more likely to act effectively in accord with ultimate purposes than the leader who works in darkness and who cannot see beyond the bounds of his sphere.

The principle mentioned in the last paragraph takes on special significance at the highest levels of command where military and political concerns become intertwined. As officers come to understand how the American political system works, they tend to see the military as another interest group vying for influence, rather than as a servant of the people and as an instrument of the government. These officers lose sight of their real purpose; they do not seek direction from the political system, only greater power. On the surface then it seems dangerous to educate military men in political science. Better they should be ignorant so they do not meddle in things outside their sphere. But this is an unrealistic and counterproductive view.

#### INTO THE POLITICAL VORTEX

It is unrealistic because high officers are inevitably drawn into the machinations of Washington pol-

itics. When an officer is thrown into this situation without prior education he is likely to act like those around him; in other words, he will play interest group politics because everyone else does it. The officer loses sight of his distinct function and unique role of being an instrument of the political system, not a part of it. It would be much better if the military man understands the dangers of political gaming to his objectivity and functionality before he goes to Washington. If he understands the nature of domestic politics he will be better able to avoid the pitfalls.

The political education of an officer must be accompanied by an ethical code which forbids participation of officers in domestic politics. An officer has a duty to state his views honestly, but he should not conspire to have his ideas put into effect by involving himself in the political maneuvers of the legislative and executive branches of the government. If an officer thinks the President is making a great mistake, then he should say so when he is asked about the matter by Congress. But he should not conspire with particular Congressmen to make his views known. If an officer feels that a particular question is extremely important then he should resign his commission and carry his case to the people. But he should not try to undermine the policy decisions of his political superiors because if he does he ceases to be a political instrument. If the officer has carried his case to the people, and the people do not agree, then the people deserve whatever rewards or punishments they reap. The people are the ultimate decision-makers.

#### THE ETHICAL CODE

The ethical code should also include restraints against interference in foreign policy in general, and the requirements of a specific policy decision in particular. Officers must be responsive to policy changes even though these upset military plans. Further, they must be able to correctly evaluate the military consequences of different policies. They should be able to recommend diplomatic, economic, political and psychological courses of action which would com-

plement their military plans. All this requires a great political understanding on the part of our military men. But once they have this knowledge they should not use it to act outside of their sphere of responsibility. They should not try to shape policy decisions by withholding information, or by giving false information, or by exaggerating their claims. Their primary duty is to give their political superiors accurate military estimations, which include information from other areas that affect the military sphere.

Once the soldiers have given their political superiors an accurate military analysis, then the political leaders have a duty to impart to the military men clear political objectives. This is a necessary corollary to officers acting within their sphere. The political leaders have the responsibility for giving policy direction, otherwise the military men must make their own policy decisions to fill the void. In the past American foreign policy has been very ambiguous, and it is impossible for military strategists to work effectively under such conditions. For instance, shortly before the Korean War the Truman government implied that Korea was not within the line of containment drawn around the Communist world, and U.S. forces were withdrawn from that country. The North Koreans attacked thinking that America would not intervene. However, the Truman government changed its mind and ordered military forces to Korea. Naturally, the military was completely unprepared for this move, and the price of ill-preparedness was paid in blood.

#### IRRESPONSIBLE POLITICAL LEADERS

Military men make policy decisions or try to force certain political courses of action for three reasons: because they do not understand their roles, because they believe they are greater than their political superiors, or because the political leaders do not carry out their responsibility to give national direction. Proper political education and ethical training of our soldiers can counter the first two, but only strong political leadership can affect the last. 66



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## Did You Know



1. that in the "free" country of Canada Jewish organizations were able to pressure the government into prosecuting a man, Ernst Zuen- del, for publishing a pamphlet that cast doubt on the Jewish Holo- caust legend,
  2. that the Zuen- del trial was covered almost nightly in 1985 by the major Canadian television networks and that the coverage in- cluded vivid TV images of the Jewish Defense League attacking Zuen- del and his attorney on the courthouse steps,
  3. that the Jewish TV media in "free" America, particularly CBS, NBC and ABC, blacked out all news of the Zuen- del trial,
  4. that revelations and evidence in the trial against the Holo- caust myth proved so embarassing for the Jews that many openly regretted that the charges were brought in the first place,
  5. that the prosecution's chief witness, Raoul Hilberg, the lead- ing Jewish Exterminationist historian (author of Destruction of the European Jews) admitted that camps such as Dachau, Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald were not death camps and that no extermination camps existed in Germany proper (now the Jews claim that the death camps were in Poland because Revisionist historians have proven camp by camp that none existed in Germany),
  6. that Zuen- del was convicted for "publishing false news" (which is especially dangerous when it is true) and that an appeals court overturned the conviction because of abuses on the part of the trial judge, particularly in regard to the admissibility of defense evi- dence,
  7. that Zuen- del was retried in 1988, but this time no survivor testimony was presented at the trial because at the first trial the defense was able to expose each Jewish survivor as a liar, and that Raoul Hilberg refused to testify because he did not wish to once again face cross-examination,
  8. that Zuen- del was able to persuade, while the trial was going on, the chief American expert on execution gas chambers, Fred Leuch- ter, to fly to Poland to inspect Auschwitz and other camps and obtain chemical samples from the walls of the supposed gas chambers and the delousing facilities (where the Zyklon B gas was really used),
  9. that prior to the investigation, Leuchter believed in the Holocaust, but that after his engineering inspection and test of the chemical samples he became convinced that the Holocaust tale was a great historical lie,
  10. that Leuchter submitted his engineering report to the court, and that on the basis of that report, the world famous WWII histor- ian David Irving declared himself a Revisionist and denounced the Holocaust as historical lie in testimony to the court,
  11. that at the behest of the Jews, the media (with the exception of a few newspapers which did a timid reporting job) in both America and Canada blacked out all news of the the Zuen- del retrial, of the Leuchter Report and of David Irving's conversion to revisionism?
- Now ask yourself why you knew none of this, and you will have taken the first step toward understanding the power of the Jews and their real agenda.

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